Abstract. With the proliferation of electronic devices, cloud storage has become an integral part of synchronizing files between devices. However, data stored on the cloud is vulnerable to unauthorized access during the sharing process. The traditional conditional proxy broadcast re-encryption solution is suitable for the above application scenarios but does not support flexible control of conditions. This article describes the concept of finegrained conditional proxy broadcast re-encryption (FGC-BPRE). The scheme utilizes an access tree to generate a re-encryption key. If the ciphertext keyword satisfies the conditions in the access tree, the proxy can convert the user's ciphertext into a new ciphertext for a group of users. In addition, this paper also constructs a fine-grained conditional proxy broadcast re-encryption scheme and verifies the security of selective ciphertext attacks without oracles.
the conversion permissions are not well controlled. To solve this problem, Weng et al. proposed the concept of conditional proxy re-encryption (C-PRE) [5] . Under C-PRE, the agent can reencrypt its ciphertext only after matching the conditions set by Alice. C-PRE has been put into practical use, such as social network data sharing systems [6] . In an actual application environment, Alice may need to share files to multiple people, at this time, the C-PRE scheme needs to perform multiple re-encryption operations, which takes up a lot of time and storage resources. The conditional proxy broadcast re-encryption proposed by Chu et al. can solve such a problem [7] . In this scheme, the proxy only needs to re-encrypt Alice's ciphertext once, and a group of users can decrypt the obtained ciphertext. The previous C-PRE and CPBRE schemes can not provide flexible control over proxy transition conditions. A proxy broadcast reencryption scheme supporting variable condition numbers, arbitrary condition combinations, and partial condition matching has yet to be proposed.
Taking the file-sharing system as an example, Alice wants to hand over the working documents to the grassroots engineers in the R&D department in Hong Kong or Guangdong. She needs to describe the forwarding conditions = ("Research and Development Department" ∧"Grassroots Engineer" ∧ ("Hongkong" ∨ "Guangdong")). In this article, we introduce the concept of fine-grained conditional proxy broadcast re-encryption. In the FGC-PBRE scheme, ciphertext is encrypted with a set of keywords , and a re-encryption key is generated using the access tree . The agent can transform Alice's ciphertext into a group of users if and only if satisfies .
Related Work
Blaze et al. introduced the concept of proxy re-encryption in Eu-rocrypt98 [1] . He proposed a two-way PRE scheme that chooses plaintext security. In this scheme, the proxy can convert Alice's ciphertext to Bob's ciphertext, or Bob's ciphertext to Alice's ciphertext. Subsequently, Ateniese et al. proposed a one-way proxy re-encryption based on bilinear pairing in ACM CCS 2005 and proved the CPA security of the scheme [8] . Weng et al. proposed a one-way proxy reencryption scheme using the adaptive model, which is the first CCA-secured one-way proxy reencryption scheme [9] . Deng et al. proposed a multi-directional proxy re-encryption scheme without bilinear pairing [10] . Chu et al. proposed a scheme for conditional proxy re-encryption [11] . The conditional proxy re-encryption implements the permission control of the encrypted ciphertext, and only the ciphertext is satisfying the specified condition set by Alice can be reencrypted by the proxy. In ProvSec 2009, Fang et al. proposed an anonymous conditional proxy re-encryption scheme that supports conditional fault tolerance [12] . Luo et al. proposed the concept of ciphertext policy attribute proxy re-encryption [13] .
Roadmap
Section two of this paper provides some related theorems. Section three illustrates the construction of the FGC-BPRE scheme. Section four demonstrates the scheme is CCA-safe in stand model. Finally, the text concludes Section five.
Preliminaries

Bilinear mapping
Let and be two multiplicative cyclic groups. and have the same prime order . is a generator of group . A bilinear map : × → satisfying the following conditions: 
The n-BDHE assumption
denotes the set {0,1, … , − 1} and * denotes the set {1,2, … , − 1}. Set prime . Let : × → be a bilinear map. Given 2 + 2 elements:
The adversary needs to decide if = ? ( , ℎ) +1 .
Use to indicate . The davantage of an adversary is:
where , ℎ ∈ , ∈ * and ∈ are randomly chosen. The n-BDHE assumption holds, if , − is negligible for all probability polynomial time adversary .
Model and security notion
This section describes the definition of fine-grained conditional proxy broadcast reencryption and their security models. The scheme uses an access tree to describe an access policy, where each internal node is a threshold gate and the leaves are associated with a keyword. Using this approach, we can render trees with "AND" and "OR" gates by using n-out-of-n and 1-out-of n threshold gates, respectively. When the ciphertext satisfies the condition of the tree node, the system will be able to re-encrypt the ciphertext using the re-encryption key that provides the user. Definition 1 (Access Tree). Let represent the access tree. The non-leaf nodes of the tree represent threshold gates, and the child nodes represent thresholds. Let be the number of children of node , is its threshold and get 0 < ≤ . When = , it is an AND gate. When = 1, the threshold is an OR gate. Each leaf node x of the tree is described by a conditional keyword and a threshold = 1. Let the depth of the root node of the access tree be 0. Let ̅̅̅̅̅ be the set of all non-leaf nodes, and is the set of all leaf nodes. The tree ( ) represents the parent of node . The function ( ) is defined only when ∈ , which represents the condition key associated with the leaf node in the tree. The access tree also defines the ordering between the child nodes of each node, that is, the child nodes of the node are numbered from 1 to . The function ( ) returns the index associated with node , each index value representing a unique node in the access tree. Definition 2 (Satisfying an Access Tree). Let be the access tree with root , and is the subtree rooted at node . Then and are the same. ( ) = 1 indicates that a set of conditions satisfies the access tree . If ∈ ,then ( ) = 1 if and only if the ( ) ∈ . If ∈ ̅̅̅̅̅ , evaluate ( ) for all children of node , ( ) return 1 if and only if at least children return 1. Definition 3 (FGC-PBRE). The final grain conditional proxy broadcast re-encryption scheme consists the following algorithms.
• ( , ): Input the security parameter λ, maximum the number of users , output the public key and the master secret key .
Input the public key , the master key , user ∈ {1,2, … , }, output user 's secret key .
• ( , , , ): Input the public key , a user set ⊆ {1,2, … , }, message and a descriptive keyword set , output the ciphertext for user set with the condition set .
• ( , , ′ , ): Input the public key , user 's secret key , a user set ′ ⊆ {1,2, … , } and an access tree , output the re-encryption key
Input the public key , re-encryption key → ′ , ′ , user , two user sets , ′ , an original ciphertext . If ( ) = 1 , output the re-encrypted ciphertext , or an error symbol ⊥.
• ( , , , , ): is used to decrypt the ciphertext. Input the public key , user 's private key , user , a user set and ciphertext for user set . Output the plaintext , or an error symbol ⊥.
is used to decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext. Input the public key , user 's private key , two users , , two user sets , ′, and reencrypted ciphertext . Output the plaintext , or an error symbol ⊥. Consistency. The affirmative determination of the FGC-PBRE scheme is defined as given two users ∈ , ∈ ′ , two user set , ′ , condition sets
Definition 4 (IND-CCA game).
Let be an adversary and be a challenger. Considering the two security games. 6. Guess. outputs the guess ′. If ′ = , the adversary wins.
Referring to the above adversary as an IND-Re-CCA adversary. Its advantage is defined as: 
Proposed FGC-PBRE Scheme
FGC-PBRE Overview
Fig. 1. FGC-BPRE framework
The framework of fine-grained conditional proxy broadcast re-encryption is shown as Figure 1 . Alice wants to share the encrypted file that has been saved on the server to someone else. At this point, she needs to generate the conversion key → ′ , and send it to the server together with multiple condition tree . At this point, the server will separately verify whether the users Bob, Carol, Dave, etc. in the group S' satisfy the forwarding conditions set by Alice.
If Bob, Dave meets the condition, the server will forward the re-encrypted ciphertext that Bob and Dave can decrypt directly. The proxy will not send the re-encrypted ciphertext to users who do not meet the criteria, such as Carol. Multiple conditions provide good control over the receiving permissions of individual users in a user group. In this process, the agent cannot get any content from Alice's ciphertext.
FGC-PBRE Construction
Define the Lagrange coefficient Δ , ( ) , where ∈ and a set of elements in :
FGC-PBRE consists of the following algorithms:
• ( , ): Construct a bilinear map parameter ( , , , , ) and message = {0,1} .
Randomly choose , ∈ , ∈ and = for = 1,2, … , , + 2, … ,2 . Set : * → , : {0,1} → * as collusion resistant hash functions. Compute = . Output the public key and the master secret key as:
User 's private key is:
is used to encrypt a message ∈ for user set ⊆ {1,2, … , } with the condition set . Picks a random ∈ , ∈ * . Output the ciphertext = ( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , ).
,2, … , } and . Randomly select ∈ {0,1} and a polynomial for each non-leaf node in the tree . Starting from the root node , the program ( , ( )) is selected from top to bottom to select the polynomial.
The program ( , ( )) is defined as follows: For each node in the tree, the degree of the polynomial is set to = − 1. Set the degree of root (0) = ( ). For any other node , set (0) = ( ) (index(x)) and randomly select to fully define . Once the polynomial is determined, for each leaf node , set = ( ). Therefore, the re-encryption key for the agent is calculated as follows:
Select a random value ← * , computes:
Chooses random value ′ ∈ * , ′ ∈ , ∈ {0,1} and sets:
Output the re-encryption key:
• ( , → ′ , ′ , , , ′ , ): Input a re-encryption key →, ′ , ′ and a ciphertext . Check whether the following equalities hold:
If one of the above equations does not holds, output ⊥. Otherwise, define a recursive algorithm ( , → ′ , ′ , ) that takes as input the original ciphertext , the reencryption key → ′ , ′ and the note in the tree.
For leaf node , if
Otherwise, output ⊥.
If is a non-leaf node, recursively call
( , → , ′ , ) on all child nodes of and store the output as . Let be an arbitrary -sized set of child notes , makes the ≠ ⊥ . If there is no such set, the node is not satisfied and the function ( , → ′ , ′ , ) returns ⊥ . Otherwise, let ′ = { ( ): ∈ } and calculate:
In the end, computes:
The re-encrypted ciphertext is = ( , 1 , 2 , 4 , C 5 , , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , ′).
• ( , , , , ) : Input a private key and an original ciphertext = ( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , ), proceeds as follows:
1. Checks whether the equations (1) ~ (3) hold. If one of the above equations does not holds, output ⊥ the abort.
. Else return ⊥ and abort.
• ( , , , , , ′ , ): Input a private key and a re-encrypted ciphertext , proceeds as follows:
1. Checks the equations:
If one of these equations does not holds, output ⊥ and abort.
. If not, returns ⊥ and abort.
. Else, returns ⊥ and abort.
Consistency.
1. If = ( , 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , ) is an original ciphertext, then: • ( , , ): ℬ verifies whether (1)- (3) is established. If the equations do not hold, output ⊥. Otherwise proceeds:
) exists in , using to recover . -Otherwise, ℬ issues ( ) query to obtain and uses to recover .
• ( , , , ′ , ): ℬ verifies whether (4)- (5) is established. If the above formula is not true, output ⊥ and abort. Otherwise, ℬ proceeds:
) exists in , using to recover . -Otherwise, ℬ runs ( ) to obtain and uses to recover .
4.
Challenge. When decides Query Phase I is over, it outputs two equal length message 0 , 1 . ℬ randomly chooses ∈ {0,1}, * ∈ . Let ℎ = * for some randomly chosen * . ℬ computes: 3 * is independent of in the adversary's view.
Query Phase II.
continues making queries as in Query Phase I with the restrictions described in the IND-O-CCA game. 6. Guess. outputs the guess ′, if ′ = , then output 1 meaning = ( +1 , ℎ); else output 0 meaning is a random value in .
The above steps complete the proof of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2.
If there exists an IND-Re-CCA adversary that can break the FGC-BPRE scheme, a simulator ℬ that can solve Decisional n-BDHE assumption. Proof. In addition to the challenge phase, the proof of Lemma 2 is like Lemma 1. The challenger constructs the challenge re-encrypted ciphertext in the following manner. ℬ randomly chooses ∈ {0,1}, * ∈ . Let ℎ = * for some randomly chosen * . ℬ computes: 
Conclusion
This article describes the concept of fine-grained conditional proxy broadcast re-encryption. If the ciphertext keyword satisfies the conditions in the access tree, then the scheme allows the proxy to convert the user's ciphertext into a new set of users' ciphertext. In addition, this paper also constructs a fine-grained conditional proxy broadcast re-encryption scheme and verifies the security of selective ciphertext attacks under the standard model. Fine-grained conditional proxy broadcast re-encryption itself is built on attribute-based encryption and can be applied to, file sharing systems, email systems, and so on.
